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 In the short time since the November 2000 presidential election, it 
has become commonplace in both academic and popular forums to 
deride the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bush v. Palm Beach County 
Canvassing Board1 and Bush v. Gore2 as—to put it bluntly—
intellectually corrupt.3 The common theme of these attacks on the 
Court’s abrupt resolution of the 2000 presidential election is that the 
decisions were crassly political efforts to decide the election on behalf 
of the party favored by the five Justices who formed the Bush v. Gore 
majority. There is ample justification for this derisive response, in 
light of the way in which the Court aggressively reached out to de-
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor, Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. 531 U.S. 70 (2000), vacating sub nom. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Har-
ris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).   
 2. 531 U.S. 98 (2000), rev’g sub nom. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
 3. This is how Benjamin Wittes of The Washington Post described the tenor of aca-
demic responses to the Supreme Court’s actions: “An overpowering chorus of (mostly lib-
eral) legal scholars has condemned the decision as a politically motivated disgrace to the 
court that will, and should, discredit it institutionally.” Benjamin Wittes, Maybe the Court 
Got It Right; A Judge’s Defense of the Florida Election Decision, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 
2001, at A23. This response to the Court’s decision was not limited to domestic commenta-
tors. As one British commentator summed up the fallout of Bush v. Gore:  
 One institution is damaged worse than any other. The circumstances of 
Bush’s election may make him weak for four years, but they will corrupt the 
reputation of the US supreme court, which presided over their working-out, far 
beyond that. . . . 
 The case of Gore v Bush has ruined [the public’s] trust [in the Court], as some 
of Tuesday night’s judgments regretfully acknowledged. Taking the case in the 
first place was a political act, transgressing the court’s historic restraints 
against interfering in state elections. It came peculiarly from a rightwing court, 
whose thrust under Chief Justice Rehnquist has been in favour of states’ rights 
on all matters. Such a deviation from their norm showed that politics had well 
and truly triumphed over intellect. 
Hugo Young, Comment and Analysis: Democracy Was Poisoned to Give Bush the Presi-
dency, THE GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 14, 2000, at 24. Jack Balkin has made this point even 
more pungently. In a recent essay in the Yale Law Journal, Professor Balkin noted a re-
cent speech in which Justice Thomas told some high school students that politics and par-
tisan considerations played no part in the Supreme Court’s deliberations. “Afterwards the 
question on many legal scholars’ minds was not whether Justice Thomas had in fact made 
these statements. The question was whether he also told the students that he believed in 
Santa Clause, the Easter Bunny, and the Tooth Fairy.” Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and 
the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1407 (2001). 
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cide a case that was by most measures unripe for Supreme Court re-
view, and also in light of the weak constitutional doctrines relied 
upon by the majority. 
 Instead of adding another voice to the chorus of denunciations, 
this Article will take a somewhat different approach to analyzing 
these decisions. This Article proceeds from the assumption that the 
Court’s holdings in Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board and Bush 
v. Gore are serious efforts by the majority to articulate new constitu-
tional doctrine, which the majority intends to apply consistently to 
future cases. In other words, this Article will assume that the Court 
intends the legal world to take its two decisions seriously. The conse-
quences of taking these decisions seriously are both extensive and 
odd. The consequences are extensive because if the Court’s holdings 
in Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Board and Bush v. Gore are gen-
eralized, they would change much about what the courts have previ-
ously said regarding both the application of constitutional law to 
elections and the application of jurisdictional flushing mechanisms 
increasingly used by federal courts in recent years to avoid making 
substantive constitutional rulings altogether. These consequences 
are odd because they fly in the face of the increasingly conservative 
(in the sense of “restrained”) attitude taken by the Court’s current 
majority in matters of constitutional structure, substantive constitu-
tional rights, and principles of justiciability. 
 The simplest way to make this point is to focus on the two most 
salient features of Bush v. Gore, and attempt to project these fea-
tures into the broader context of future constitutional litigation. The 
two most salient features of Bush v. Gore are: (1) The Court’s holding 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the state of Florida from 
allowing local officials to control recounts in elections in which ques-
tions have been raised about the accuracy of the vote count;4 and (2) 
the three-judge plurality’s assertion that Article II of the Constitu-
tion and federal election statutes prohibit states from structuring 
their elections for presidential electors in a manner that permits 
state judicial review of the accuracy of election results.5 A third fea-
ture of both decisions is the procedural irregularity of the decisions; 
i.e., the fact that the Court took an appeal that was not ripe, in which 
the main plaintiffs probably did not even have standing, and in 
which the state supreme court clearly indicated its reliance on an in-
dependent and adequate state ground—all in order for the five-
member majority to provide its version of what Judge Richard Posner 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06. 
 5. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). 
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has characterized as “rough justice.”6 This Article focuses, however, 
on the two substantive aspects of Bush v. Gore. After discussing the 
strange doctrinal repercussions of these two substantive rulings, the 
Article concludes with a few preliminary conclusions concerning 
whether and how to take Bush v. Gore seriously. 
I.   CONSEQUENCE ONE: THE NATIONALIZATION OF ELECTIONS 
 To the extent that there is any clearly articulated holding in the 
schematic Bush v. Gore per curiam opinion, it is that Florida’s sys-
tem of ensuring accurate vote counts violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting losing candi-
dates to engage in an extended “contest” of disputed votes.7 Beyond 
this bald and broad statement, it is difficult to discern from the Su-
preme Court’s opinion exactly what part of the Florida contest sys-
tem violated the Constitution. The Court identified three factors that 
raised constitutional concerns: (1) there were no uniform standards 
to guide local officials in determining when certain ambiguously 
marked ballots indicated the voter’s intent to vote for a particular 
candidate;8 (2) in at least one county (Miami-Dade), only a portion of 
the county’s votes were manually counted and conveyed to the Secre-
tary of State for inclusion in the certified results;9 and (3) the use of 
voting machines to identify for manual tabulation both undervotes 
(where it initially appears that no candidate was selected) and over-
votes (where it initially appears that more than one candidate was 
selected) would go beyond the design parameters of the machines in 
a way that could produce inaccurate results.10 According to the Court, 
these problems made it impossible for the manual recount ordered by 
the Florida Supreme Court to satisfy minimal constitutional stan-
dards of “equal treatment and fundamental fairness”11—at least in 
time to satisfy what the Court felt was the absolute deadline of De-
cember 12th for determining the outcome of any election challenge. 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 719, 736 (2001); see also William P. Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, 
and Rough Justice, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787 (2001). 
 7. Under Florida law, challenges to the accuracy of vote counts prior to the certifica-
tion of the vote results were conducted before the local canvassing board under the “pro-
test” statute, FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000) (amended 2001), while postcertification chal-
lenges must have been raised in the circuit court under the “contest” statute, id. § 102.168 
(amended 2001).  Florida’s election laws are codified at FLA. STAT. chs. 101-02 (2000).  Af-
ter the 2000 presidential election, the Florida Legislature made significant amendments to 
the state election code.  See 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40.  This Article considers the election stat-
utes as they then existed before the 2001 amendments.  
 8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06. 
 9. Id. at 108. 
 10. Id. at 110. 
 11. Id. at 109. 
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 The intricacies of the particular version of equal protection used 
by the Court to reach this conclusion are dissected at length by other 
contributors to this symposium. I would like to focus on the conse-
quences of a tangential aspect of the Court’s ruling. In holding that 
the Florida Supreme Court had failed to satisfy basic equal protec-
tion standards when that court ordered the manual recount to con-
tinue, the United States Supreme Court majority emphasized the in-
consistency of having local variations within the context of a state-
wide recount. “When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must 
be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of 
equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.”12 The ine-
quality, in other words, was inherent in the fact that Florida voters 
living in counties that did not undertake a manual recount of ballots 
received a less rigorous review of their votes than Florida voters who 
lived in counties where manual recounts did occur. 
 The odd thing about this holding is that the Bush v. Gore  major-
ity went out of its way to emphasize the link between the inconsis-
tent treatment of voters in different localities and the fact that the 
state supreme court had ordered a statewide remedy. Conversely, the 
Court also suggested that if the local governments themselves had 
implemented the unequal treatment of voters, there would be no 
equal protection violation. “The question before the Court is not 
whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop 
different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are pre-
sented with a situation where a state court with the power to assure 
uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural 
safeguards.”13 This conclusion refers to the Florida Supreme Court’s 
order that a manual recount be conducted “in all Florida counties 
where there was an undervote.”14  
 In fairness to the United States Supreme Court, this ruling by the 
Florida court was the weakest part of the state court’s opinion. The 
Florida court greatly complicated the practical difficulties of the 
manual recount by suddenly expanding the Gore contest case from 
the handful of counties selected by the Gore campaign to every 
county in the state—including counties where neither the Gore nor 
the Bush campaign had identified problems or even suggested that 
problems with the vote count might have occurred. This not only took 
the case far beyond the parameters of the carefully focused Gore 
complaint, it also unnecessarily broadened the scope of the Florida 
election contest statute. The Florida court used the broad equitable 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2001]                          ODD CONSEQUENCES 1009 
 
authority granted under one subsection of the contest statute15 to 
override another subsection’s particularized requirements for bring-
ing a contest action. Under the latter subsection’s requirements, a 
plaintiff in an election contest case must raise specific allegations of 
fraud, misconduct, or the rejection of “a number of legal votes suffi-
cient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.”16 The 
most reasonable reading of the statute therefore would limit the 
scope of an election challenge to the specific areas in which the plain-
tiff has raised and can substantiate the required allegation of fraud, 
misconduct, or undercounts. If no such allegation can be made re-
garding the count in particular counties, then the statute presuma-
bly does not envision a contest with regard to the count in those 
counties. If a statewide election is held in which there is evidence of 
fraud in only one county, for example, it is neither logical nor rea-
sonable that plaintiffs seeking to contest the vote count in the prob-
lematic county should be forced to investigate fraud in every other 
county of the state at the same time. 
 By ordering statewide relief for what was evidently a localized 
problem, the Florida Supreme Court gave the United States Supreme 
Court the opening it needed to reverse the state court on equal pro-
tection grounds. But the United States Supreme Court’s equal pro-
tection ruling is not rendered any more logical by the state court’s 
misapplication of Florida election law. The United States Supreme 
Court’s ruling rests on the dichotomy the majority draws between a 
purely localized electoral system and one operated under the aegis of 
statewide rules. The Bush v. Gore majority evidently believed that 
the Equal Protection Clause provides different levels of protection 
under the two different systems. Under a purely localized system, 
different counting methods—and presumably differential error 
rates—do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This is the clear 
implication of the Court’s emphasis on the fact that Bush v. Gore was 
not a case in which “local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, 
may develop different systems for implementing elections.”17 Under 
an electoral system governed by statewide rules, on the other hand, 
the Supreme Court seems to hold that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires “equal treatment and fundamental fairness” in the form of 
uniform standards governing postelection assessments of electoral 
accuracy. 
                                                                                                                    
 15. The contest statute provides the judge in a contest case with the authority to 
“fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the 
complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, 
and to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances.” FLA. STAT. § 102.168(8) 
(amended 2001) (emphasis added). 
 16. Id. § 102.168(3)(c). 
 17. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
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 There are three problems with this dichotomy. First, there is no 
such thing—in Florida or in any other state—as truly “local entities, 
in the exercise of their expertise” regarding electoral matters. Every 
local entity operates under authority granted by some aspect of state 
law. No local government entity exercises sovereign authority over 
elections independent of the state government from which the local 
government obtains its power. Assume, for example, that Florida 
election law did not provide for the intervention of the state courts in 
election disputes via the contest statute.18 This hypothetical system 
would leave all election disputes to the separate canvassing boards in 
each county, operating under authority granted to them by the Flor-
ida election protest statute.19 Such a hypothetical system would in-
volve, to use the Supreme Court’s phrase, “local entities, in the exer-
cise of their expertise . . . develop[ing] different systems for imple-
menting elections,”20 but the local entities would be exercising this 
authority only because a statewide rule—i.e., the protest statute—
authorized different counties to devise different vote count methods. 
In such a system, it is still the state—not the local government—that 
is creating the “different systems for implementing elections.” It is 
therefore unclear why the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore majority be-
lieves that one form of statewide authorization of differential vote 
counts—i.e., the protest statute—satisfies the Equal Protection 
Clause while another form of statewide authorization of differential 
vote counts—i.e., the state supreme court’s enforcement of the con-
test statute—does not. Indeed, the logic of the Court’s equal protec-
tion decision in Bush v. Gore compels the contrary conclusion. In 
other words, if the Equal Protection Clause indeed requires uniform 
standards and recount methods whenever state law provides a rem-
edy for an election challenge, it should not matter whether the state 
law providing that remedy is embodied in a state court opinion or a 
state statute devolving responsibility to local boards. A statewide 
remedy is a statewide remedy, and the method of implementing that 
statewide remedy is irrelevant to the application of the underlying 
equal protection principle. 
 The second problem with the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion to overturn the Florida Supreme Court’s election contest ruling 
on supposedly narrow equal protection grounds21 is that the United 
States Supreme Court’s broad requirement of “equal treatment and 
                                                                                                                    
 18. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (amended 2001). 
 19. Id. § 102.166 (amended 2001). 
 20. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 21. The Court emphasized that its equal protection ruling was not intended to apply 
beyond the context of the Florida election contest case. Id. at 109 (“Our consideration is 
limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election proc-
esses generally presents many complexities.”). 
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fundamental fairness” is not logically limited to postelection chal-
lenges of vote counts. The logic of the Court’s Bush v. Gore opinion 
applies also to the conduct of the election itself. If federal constitu-
tional principles of “equal treatment and fundamental fairness” re-
quire identical standards for resolving disputes over the accuracy of 
vote counts, those same principles logically should require similar 
safeguards in every aspect of the election process. It would be inco-
herent to permit unequal treatment and fundamental unfairness in 
the original electoral process and impose equality and fairness re-
quirements only to postelection contests, after the real damage has 
already been done. 
 The problem with this seemingly unavoidable conclusion is that 
many radical consequences necessarily flow from the application of 
the Court’s equal protection holding in Bush v. Gore to contexts be-
yond postelection challenges. In particular, the Bush v. Gore equal 
protection principles logically mandate that states such as Florida 
may not allow their counties to use different types of voting machines 
if there is evidence that some machines produce significantly higher 
error rates than others. In a system such as the one Florida used in 
the 2000 election, the percentage of a county’s votes that were 
counted as valid often depended on the type of voting machine used 
by that county.22 Therefore, voters in counties that used more sophis-
ticated, optical-scanning machines had a much greater likelihood of 
having their votes counted as valid than voters in counties using 
flawed punch-card machines.23 This disparity violates the basic 
equality principle cited by the Bush v. Gore majority as the justifica-
tion for its decision to overturn the Florida Supreme Court: “The idea 
that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another 
                                                                                                                    
 22. The error rates of the various kinds of voting machines may be a more compli-
cated issue than it seemed immediately after the Florida vote. A recent study by political 
scientists and computer engineers at Caltech and the Massachusetts Institute for Technol-
ogy confirmed the common assumption that optical scanners are the most reliable types of 
voting machines and that both punch-card and lever machines are deeply flawed and 
should be replaced. See Richard Winton, Balloting Study Calls for Updating Equipment, 
L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at A1. The study also found flaws in some types of electronic 
voting methods, however. The study found, for example,  
that some electronic voting machines, such as those that use buttons, were 
more prone to error than optical scanners. It also said that touch-screen voting 
remains “unproven” and that Internet voting is far from secure. Internet vot-
ing, the authors said, is a decade away because of the potential for fraud and 
hackers.  
Id. 
 23. According to the Florida Governor’s Select Task Force on Election Procedures, 
Standards, and Technology, “voters in counties that used optical scanners with the votes 
counted at precincts had an average error rate of 0.83 percent, compared with an average 
statewide error rate for all equipment of 2.93 percent.” Sue Ann Pressley, Election Panel 
Calls for Changes in Florida, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2001, at A10. 
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is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative gov-
ernment.”24 
 Other elements of state voting systems also should be subject to 
attack under this new electoral equal protection regime. For exam-
ple, one of the key factors contributing to variations in the applica-
tion of voting standards is the localized nature of the administrative 
apparatus that actually conducts elections. In Florida, as in most 
states, the supervisor of elections is a local official, whose authority is 
circumscribed somewhat by state law but who may exercise signifi-
cant discretion in crucial decisions ranging from the types of voting 
machines purchased by the county, to the hiring of the personnel who 
administer the election, to the actual counting of the votes and the 
initial assessment of challenges to the vote count. If absolute consis-
tency in the application of statewide election law is now a mandate of 
the Equal Protection Clause, then the typically localized structure of 
election law administration should be considered unconstitutional, at 
least to the extent that local officials are given discretion to introduce 
into the electoral system variables that lead to the conclusion that lo-
cal officials are using “varying standards to determine what [is] a le-
gal vote.”25 States may continue to elect their election officials locally 
without violating the equal protection principles of Bush v. Gore but 
only if those local officials are transformed into purely ministerial ac-
tors carrying out policies that are identical for the entire electorate of 
the state. Despite the Court’s suggestion to the contrary, if we are to 
take Bush v. Gore seriously, local officials may not, “in the exercise of 
their expertise . . . develop different systems for implementing elec-
tions.”26 
 The radical implications of applying the equal protection princi-
ples of Bush v. Gore seriously do not stop at the state border. The 
third problem with the Court’s attempt to limit the scope of its ruling 
is that the Bush v. Gore equal protection principles must apply na-
tionwide. According to the Supreme Court’s own logic, it is the Equal 
Protection Clause itself that imposes the requirement of uniformity—
i.e., “equal treatment and fundamental fairness”—on the electoral 
system, not the particular structure of each state’s system. According 
to the Court, equal protection norms now prohibit a state from order-
ing one county’s local officials to implement state election law in a 
manner that varies from the way that law is applied in other coun-
ties in the same state. The logic of these equal protection norms 
should also prohibit any state from devising election procedures in a 
national election that have the effect of granting one group (i.e., that 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 107 (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969)). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 109. 
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state’s voters) a more effective voting process than another (i.e., the 
citizens of other states who are voting for candidates for the same 
national office).27 If, as the Bush v. Gore majority holds, equal protec-
tion principles now prohibit a state from “accord[ing] arbitrary and 
disparate treatment to voters in its different counties,”28 then those 
same principles prohibit “arbitrary and disparate treatment” of vot-
ers in different states, at least in a national election. A quote used to 
support the concurring Justices’ argument regarding the Article II 
issue in Bush v. Gore is also apropos to the equal protection issue: 
“[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions 
implicate a uniquely important national interest. For the President 
and the Vice President of the United States are the only elected offi-
cials who represent all the voters in the Nation.”29 Therefore, to put 
the matter bluntly, Bush v. Gore has nationalized the electoral proc-
ess of electing a President. 
 This conclusion is a basic and unavoidable consequence of the 
Court’s expansion of equal protection principles in Bush v. Gore. 
Once the Equal Protection Clause is expanded to encompass the re-
quirement that all vote counts and challenges to vote counts in a par-
ticular election must be conducted uniformly, it is impossible to avoid 
the implication that the same uniformity must extend nationwide—
at least with regard to presidential elections. Consider the other two 
categories of electoral law in which the Equal Protection Clause has 
played a significant role prior to Bush v. Gore: racial equality and the 
Reynolds v. Sims30 principle of one-person, one-vote. Neither of these 
applications of equal protection jurisprudence would permit officials 
in one state to deviate significantly from the norm established by the 
Court and applied to every other state. In neither area would the 
Court even consider allowing (to cite the Bush v. Gore  locution) “lo-
cal entities, in the exercise of their expertise, [to] develop different 
systems for implementing elections.”31 Mississippi may not “in the 
exercise of local expertise” construct an electoral system based on dif-
ferent, more discriminatory standards of racial equality than those 
applied by Georgia. Likewise, the Tennessee Legislature may not ar-
gue, based on its local expertise, that voters in rural districts in that 
state deserve a somewhat greater proportion of the state’s overall al-
location of congressional offices than voters in the similarly sylvan 
areas of North Carolina. The one-person, one-vote principle applies to 
all states in exactly the same way. 
                                                                                                                    
 27. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 107. 
 29. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
780, 794-95 (1983) (footnote omitted)). 
 30. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 31. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
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 The lesson to be learned from the Court’s pre-Bush v. Gore equal 
protection jurisprudence is that equal protection rules are the same 
everywhere, and if those rules now include uniformity in the mecha-
nisms for ascertaining voter accuracy, then those standards should 
require the identical vote-count and vote-challenge mechanisms in 
all the relevant jurisdictions whose citizens participate in a particu-
lar election. In county elections, therefore, every precinct must follow 
the same standards; in statewide elections, every county must follow 
the same standards; and in presidential elections, every state must 
follow the same standards. In sum, if we take Bush v. Gore seriously, 
one of the most far-reaching consequences is that the new Equal Pro-
tection Clause election jurisprudence dictates the nationalization of 
the administration of elections. 
II.   CONSEQUENCE TWO: THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION OF ELECTIONS 
 The nationalization of elections is not the only odd consequence 
that flows from the Supreme Court’s equal protection holding in 
Bush v. Gore. The other odd consequence is the lowering of constitu-
tional obstacles to challenging election results. Prior to Bush v. Gore, 
the federal courts had been notably reluctant to entertain constitu-
tional challenges to election results. As a federal district court in 
Florida summarized the pre-Bush v. Gore law, “it is not the job of a 
federal court to involve itself with settling disputes as to how the 
state deals with counting votes after illegal votes are cast. Instead, a 
federal court should only intervene into state election disputes where 
the entire process is fundamentally unfair.”32 Historically, federal 
courts have held that this standard has not been met in cases involv-
ing the miscounting of votes by human election officials,33 mechanical 
errors in the operation of the voting machines,34 political party inter-
vention in determining the outcome of a disputed political primary,35 
or even massive voter fraud that does not result in the state’s invali-
dation of the election.36 In one Fifth Circuit decision explaining that 
court’s refusal to intervene in an election dispute over the counting of 
absentee ballots, the court asserted the traditional reluctance of fed-
eral courts to get involved in “garden variety” election disputes.37 The 
court cited as a “typical result” one of its own election law precedents, 
                                                                                                                    
 32. Scheer v. City of Miami, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
 33. Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 1996); Bodine v. Elkhart County Election 
Bd., 788 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 34. Bodine, 788 F.2d at 1270; Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 35. Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 36. Scheer, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
 37. Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds 
and remanded, 777 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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in which “even though votes inadvertently counted incorrectly threw 
an election to the wrong candidate, this court refused to intervene.”38 
 The general rule prior to Bush v. Gore was that federal courts 
would intervene in election disputes only where there was evidence 
of discrimination on the basis of race, systematic disenfranchisement 
of voters, or fraudulent conduct (such as stuffing ballot boxes) that is 
intended specifically to throw an election.39 There was no evidence of 
the first or third types of claims in the Bush campaign’s federal court 
constitutional challenges to the Gore campaign’s state-court actions 
contesting the election results in certain Florida counties. While the 
Gore campaign might have had evidence to assert racial discrimina-
tion against its supporters,40 the Bush campaign did not. The Bush 
campaign also could not claim that intentional fraud was behind the 
decision of the Florida Supreme Court to order the recounts to con-
tinue. Florida has produced other cases that provide illustrations of 
this kind of behavior, but even the most partisan Bush supporters 
would not argue that in its resolution of the Gore appeals, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court engaged in massive election fraud of the sort that 
often justifies federal court intervention.41 
 Since the Bush campaign had no evidence of racial discrimination 
or massive vote fraud in the state court’s application of the Florida 
election contest statute, the United States Supreme Court majority 
that ruled in Bush’s favor had the choice of either holding that the 
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida election law 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Id. (citing Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 39. See Pettengill v. Putnam County Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973) 
(holding that federal courts will not intervene in the administration of an election “in the 
absence of aggravating factors such as denying the right of citizens to vote for reasons of 
race, or fraudulent interference with a free election by stuffing of the ballot box, or other 
unlawful conduct which interferes with the individual’s right to vote”) (citations omitted). 
 40. See U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Draft Report: Voting Irregularities in Florida 
During 2000 Presidential Election (2001), at http://www.usccr.gov/vote2000/stdraft1/ 
main.htm (citing widespread disenfranchisement of voters in the 2000 presidential election 
in Florida, especially of African-American voters). 
 41. Prior to Bush v. Gore, even massive election fraud did not always justify federal 
court intervention. The most notorious recent Florida case involving widespread election 
irregularities involved the 1994 Miami mayoral election. The Florida courts found evidence 
of massive absentee voter fraud. See In re The Matter of the Protest of Election Returns 
and Absentee Ballots in November 4, 1997 Election for Miami, Fla., 707 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 725 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 1998). According to the state court, 
“the evidence demonstrated an extensive ‘pattern of fraudulent, intentional and criminal 
conduct that resulted in such an extensive abuse of the absentee ballot laws that it can 
fairly be said that the intent of these laws was totally frustrated.’” Id. at 1171 (quoting fi-
nal judgment of the Circuit Court). Nevertheless, the state courts refused to void the elec-
tion but chose instead to invalidate only the absentee ballots. Id. at 1175. In a subsequent 
federal court challenge to the constitutionality of this remedy, the federal district court re-
fused to get involved. “[F]ederal courts can only intervene in a state election dispute in . . . 
extreme circumstances. This case does not present one of those circumstances.” Scheer, 15 
F. Supp. 2d at 1340. 
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amounted to a systematic disenfranchisement of voters or broaden-
ing the equal protection standard beyond its previously very narrow 
scope. The Court chose to do the latter, because there was no serious 
argument that the “arbitrary and disparate treatment” of voters—if 
indeed that is what happened in Florida’s election contest cases—
was “systematic” in the way earlier jurisprudence had defined that 
term. 
 The classic case of systematic disenfranchisement is Reynolds v. 
Sims,42 in which voters were systematically disenfranchised because 
the very structure of the electoral system regularly gave some voters 
more power than others. What happened in Florida was very differ-
ent. The difference is encapsulated in Gamza v. Aguirre,43 a promi-
nent Fifth Circuit election decision. In that case, the Fifth Circuit  
recognize[d] a distinction between state laws and patterns of state 
action that systematically deny equality in voting, and episodic 
events that, despite non-discriminatory laws, may result in the di-
lution of an individual’s vote. Unlike systematically discriminatory 
laws, isolated events that adversely affect individuals are not pre-
sumed to be a violation of the equal protection clause.44 
 Gamza involved facts very similar to the facts in Florida. Specifi-
cally, the case involved errors in punch-card voting machines. In 
some precincts, voters were given ballots that contained the names of 
five candidates, despite the fact that only two candidates were run-
ning in the runoff election.45 Thus, in the three precincts with the in-
correct ballots, the plaintiff Gamza was listed in position one on the 
ballot. In the precincts with the correct list of candidates, the win-
ning candidate was listed in position one and Gamza was listed in 
position two.46 Unfortunately, when the votes were counted, all the 
votes in position one from every precinct were tabulated and awarded 
to the winning candidate, including the votes from the three pre-
cincts in which Gamza had actually been listed in position one.47 If 
this error had not been made, Gamza would have won the election. 
To make matters worse, ballots were destroyed in violation of a court 
order during the period when the election results were being chal-
lenged.48 Based on this evidence, the federal district court ruled that 
Gamza’s constitutional rights were violated.49 The Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that whatever errors occurred in the process were 
                                                                                                                    
 42. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 43. 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 44. Id. at 453. 
 45. Id. at 451. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 451-52. 
 49. Id. at 450. 
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merely “episodic events” that did not amount to systematic violations 
of federal constitutional rights.50 “The unlawful administration by 
state officers of a non-discriminatory state law, ‘resulting in its un-
equal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not 
a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it 
an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.’”51 
 The phrasing of the distinction between systematic disenfran-
chisement and “episodic events” that produce inaccurate election re-
sults is peculiar to the Fifth Circuit, but similar themes appear in 
various lower court opinions from many different circuits.52 The gen-
eral pattern in these cases, as summarized by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, is that the federal courts will intervene to overturn 
an election only if two elements are present: “(1) likely reliance by 
voters on an established election procedure and/or official pro-
nouncements about what the procedure will be in the coming elec-
tion; and (2) significant disenfranchisement that results from a 
change in the election procedures.”53 
 Bush v. Gore seems to broaden the equal protection analysis of 
election law significantly beyond this previously narrow range of fac-
tors. This is difficult to understand, however, because the lower 
courts’ circumscribed approach to the constitutional review of elec-
tion cases reflects the same general tendencies that have defined the 
increasingly conservative Supreme Court’s constitutional jurispru-
dence in recent decades. One such principle is the heavy emphasis 
the Supreme Court has recently placed on the requirement that 
plaintiffs in an equal protection case demonstrate that the alleged 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Id. at 453-54. 
 51. Id. at 453 (quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944)). 
 52. See, e.g., Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In general, 
garden variety election irregularities do not violate the Due Process Clause, even if they 
control the outcome of the vote or election.”); Gold v. Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 
1996) (“[P]laintiffs who can establish nothing more than ‘unintended irregularities’ in the 
conduct of elections are barred from obtaining § 1983 relief in federal court, provided an 
adequate and fair state remedy exists.”); Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 814 F.2d 332, 
340, 344 (7th Cir. 1987) (expressing unwillingness to get involved in overseeing local elec-
tions process and suggesting that a federal constitutional claim for election irregularities 
exists only if the election officials have “adopted a canvassing system incapable of produc-
ing an honest vote even when the [officials do their] utmost” or when the system is “de-
signed from the ground up to ensure dishonest elections”); Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 
1314 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Although federal courts closely scrutinize state laws whose very de-
sign infringes on the rights of voters, federal courts will not intervene to examine the valid-
ity of individual ballots or supervise the administrative details of a local election.”); Hen-
don v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 710 F.2d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[N]ot every election 
irregularity gives rise to a constitutional claim. Whether the irregularity amounts to a con-
stitutional claim depends on its severity, whether it was intentional or more of a negligent 
failure to carry out properly the state election procedures, and whether it erodes the de-
mocratic process.”). 
 53. Bennett, 140 F.3d at 1226-27. 
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violation is the result of intentional conduct by the government.54 
Thus, allegations of negligence or incompetence in the operation of 
an election are insufficient to state an equal protection claim—
regardless of the effect such actions have on the outcome of the elec-
tion.55 The second such principle—articulated in due process terms in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services56—is 
that the government is not responsible for protecting private parties 
against their own incompetencies, or even against intentional harms 
created by other private parties. The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has applied this principle in the election context in terms that 
seem directly applicable to the Florida presidential election fiasco:  
The natural reading of the documents is that the Board has done a 
slapdash job of administering the law, and that private parties 
(“dishonest precinct captains”) have taken advantage of its laxity. 
The failure of the police and other agents of the government to 
stop private offenders is not itself a violation of the                    
Constitution. . . . The remedies for ineffectual public officials are 
political rather than constitutional.57 
 It is difficult to see how any of the facts in the Florida Supreme 
Court’s handling of the 2000 presidential election could be made to fit 
the pattern of constitutional litigation in the election cases described 
above. There is simply nothing to indicate that Florida officials—
including judicial officials—intentionally designed its election system 
to deny Bush voters the right to exercise their franchise effectively, 
nor is there any evidence that any public official intentionally ma-
nipulated an otherwise legitimate electoral process with the specific 
intent to deny George W. Bush the election. There is abundant evi-
dence of administrative incompetence, poor planning, incoherent 
statutory drafting, inadequate state guidance on election procedures, 
and fumbling judicial efforts to craft remedies in response to vote-
count challenges at the last minute and under the heavy pressure of 
a looming federal deadline. But none of these factors even come close 
to stating a claim under the precedents that existed prior to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore. Thus, if we are to take Bush 
v. Gore seriously, we must assume that the Supreme Court intended 
to alter these precedents and the broader equal protection principles 
on which they are based. 
                                                                                                                    
 54. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 (1976). 
 55. See Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Bd., 788 F.2d 1270, 1272 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“[S]ection 1983 is implicated only when there is ‘willful conduct which undermines the or-
ganic processes by which candidates are elected.’”) (quoting Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 
861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
 56. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 57. Kasper, 814 F.2d at 343. 
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 The question is: which elements of the preexisting precedents did 
the Supreme Court intend to alter? It is difficult to believe that the 
Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore majority is proposing to do away with 
the intent requirement for equal protection challenges in the election 
context, but if these five Justices do not propose to abandon the in-
tent requirement, then they must at least propose to expand the no-
tion of intent to encompass the concept that officials “intended” to 
produce the inequalities that actually resulted from the officials’ ac-
tions in adopting a flawed system of counting votes. The problem 
with this theory, on the other hand, is that it contradicts the very 
specific statements the Court has made with regard to intent in cases 
like Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney58 and 
McCleskey v. Kemp.59 Feeney established the proposition that  
“[d]iscriminatory purpose”. . . implies more than intent as volition 
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
sionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected or reaffirmed a 
particular course of action at least in part “because of,” not merely 
“in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.60  
 McCleskey applied that rationale to reject an equal protection 
challenge to the Georgia death penalty statute, which had the unfor-
tunate consequence of producing death sentences that correlated 
heavily with the race of the victim—a clear form of racial discrimina-
tion. The Court held that the Georgia statute was not unconstitu-
tional because it was not adopted “because of” the racial inequalities 
produced by the flawed application of the statute in the real world. 
“There was no evidence [at the time the statute was enacted], and 
there is none now, that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital 
punishment statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose.”61 
 In McCleskey, the Court did suggest that proof of intentional dis-
crimination in individual cases could result in an as-applied equal 
protection challenge to the particular application of the statute, but 
that theory would not help the Bush campaign in Bush v. Gore. No 
one in Bush v. Gore suggested that any judge or election official or-
dered the recount of votes with the specific intent of denying the elec-
tion to George W. Bush. Thus, unless the concept of intent is ex-
panded far beyond the Feeney notion that the Constitution prohibits 
only actions that occur “because of” their invidious effects, even an 
as-applied challenge to the Florida vote counting process would be 
unavailing. So the only possible explanation of the Supreme Court’s 
equal protection holding (again, if we are to take Bush v. Gore seri-
                                                                                                                    
 58. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
 59. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 60. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (footnote and citation omitted). 
 61. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298. 
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ously) is that the Court intended to abandon the narrow Washington 
v. Davis/Feeney/McCleskey concept of intent. For the sake of all those 
languishing on death row in Georgia and other states, it is unfortu-
nate that the Bush v. Gore majority was not more explicit about an-
nouncing this very important change. 
 Aside from the intent problem, there is the matter of converting 
every local election irregularity into a matter of federal constitutional 
law. This is the great fear expressed by the lower federal courts, 
which recoil at the prospect of a deluge of constitutional challenges to 
every close vote count in every election.  
If every state election irregularity were considered a federal consti-
tutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate every state 
election dispute, and the elaborate state election contest proce-
dures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of the 
multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, 
would be superseded by a section 1983 gloss.62 
 Apparently the lower courts’ greatest fear has now been realized, 
because the Florida election dispute was little more than a run-of-
the-mill dispute about snafus in the counting of disputed ballots. 
These disputes happen frequently in local, state, and national elec-
tions, and all such disputes apparently have now been elevated to the 
status of equal protection claims pertaining to the state’s “obligation 
to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its 
electorate.”63 The only plausible way around this result is to somehow 
treat presidential elections different from all other elections, and 
thus limit at least the frequency of the constitutional/electoral del-
uges to once every four years. The problem with this explanation, 
however, is that the nature of the office for which the election is held 
has no bearing on the nature of the underlying constitutional claim. 
It is impossible to imagine a decision from the Supreme Court hold-
ing that the rules regarding racial discrimination are more rigorous 
in presidential elections than in local or state elections. Racial dis-
crimination is racial discrimination, and the type of election in which 
the discrimination occurs is irrelevant to the existence of the consti-
tutional violation. Thus, the only logical conclusion one can draw 
from the Court’s equal protection holding in Bush v. Gore is that 
every election is now subject to the new, more liberal equal protec-
tion challenges to election procedures. 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 63. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000). 
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III.   CONSEQUENCE THREE: THE ELIMINATION OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS 
ON STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER 
 The contradictions between the Bush v. Gore majority’s equal pro-
tection holding and the general tenor of equal protection election law 
prior to Bush v. Gore is only one dissonant aspect of that decision. It 
is difficult to reconcile the majority’s aggressive stance toward the 
abstruse equal protection claims in Bush v. Gore and the Court’s 
comparatively constrained approach to the enforcement of equal pro-
tection rights in other, more concrete contexts such as Feeney and 
McCleskey. But the inconsistencies between Bush v. Gore and exist-
ing jurisprudence do not stop with the majority’s equal protection 
ruling. 
 A separate set of inconsistencies stems from the three concurring 
Justices’ application of Article II, Section 1 to state-court interpreta-
tions of state law. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the three 
concurring Justices starts from the premise—also articulated in the 
per curiam opinion—that state legislatures have plenary power over 
the details of presidential elections. Rehnquist then proceeds to ex-
plain that the presumption of plenary state legislative power gives 
federal courts the authority to override state court interpretations of 
state laws in order to ensure that the state courts are not altering 
the state legislature’s policies in postelection vote challenges. 
Postelection alterations in state law are significant because the “safe 
harbor” provision of federal law provides that the state’s selection of 
electors shall be “conclusive” if the electors are chosen “by laws en-
acted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors.”64 
There is no question that the Florida election laws used in the Gore 
election challenges were literally enacted prior to election day, but 
the Supreme Court held in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board that “a legislative wish to take advantage of the ‘safe harbor’ 
would counsel against any construction of the Election Code that 
Congress might deem to be a change in the law.”65 Thus, the Court 
expanded the federal statutory term “enacted” to mean “definitively 
interpreted,” which makes judicial interpretations of state law rele-
vant in assessing whether changes in the law have taken place after 
the election. 
 Of course, the federal safe harbor provision does not impose a 
binding obligation on the states. In other words, the states are not 
required to partake of the conclusive presumption afforded to them if 
they comply with the requirements of federal election law. Nothing in 
the federal law prohibits a state from deciding, for example, that 
                                                                                                                    
 64. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 65. 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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other values—such as the value of electoral certainty regarding the 
intent of the voters—trump the importance of the conclusive pre-
sumption. Certainly nothing in Florida law specifically makes meet-
ing the federal safe harbor certification deadline the premier value to 
be elevated over all others in presidential elections. In the absence of 
such clear and unequivocal guidance, whether the state has made 
this value choice would ordinarily be a question determined by the 
state courts in interpreting the entire corpus of state law on the sub-
ject of elections. In the concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore, however, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist transferred the power to answer this ques-
tion of state law from the state courts to the federal courts and then 
proceeded to exercise this new federal power to interpret state law to 
override the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own state 
election code.66 
 Whether the state supreme court or three concurring Justices of 
the United States Supreme Court had the better argument about the 
meaning of Florida law as applied to presidential elections is really 
beside the point, although there is a good case to be made that the 
state court produced a far more subtle and detailed analysis of the 
relevant law than the concurring Justices. In truth, the literal terms 
of the relevant Florida statutes do not answer precisely the questions 
posed in the 2000 presidential election dispute. It is impossible to en-
vision full compliance with all of the main legal requirements im-
posed by Florida law on the election process: i.e., the accurate deter-
mination of voter intent,67 full consideration of pre-certification chal-
lenges under the protest statute,68 compliance with the state canvass-
ing commission’s obligation to certify the election seven days after 
the election,69 complete judicial adjudication of postcertification chal-
lenges under the contest statute,70 and satisfaction of the presumed 
legislative desire to take advantage of the safe harbor provision of 
federal law. 
 The unfortunate fact is that the Florida election code was an in-
consistent, poorly drafted mess, which provided no clear answers to 
most of the major questions posed by the 2000 presidential election 
challenges and downright contradictory answers to some of those 
                                                                                                                    
 66. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 67. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (amended 2001) (“No vote shall be declared invalid or 
void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing 
board.”). 
 68. Id. § 102.166(5) (amended 2001) (requiring county canvassing boards to rectify 
problems in an election if a sample recount “indicates an error in the vote tabulation which 
could affect the outcome of the election”). 
 69. Id. § 102.111 (amended 2001). 
 70. Id. § 102.168(3)(c) (permitting judicial challenges to election results upon proof of 
the “[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to 
change or place in doubt the result of the election”). 
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questions.71 The Bush v. Gore concurring Justices were correct in 
pointing out that the Florida Supreme Court introduced deadlines 
into the protest/certification/contest process that were not stated in 
the statutes themselves. But the Florida court did so in an effort to 
give all the various Florida election statutes some semblance of their 
intended effects, and to avoid effectively reading the protest and con-
test statutes out of presidential elections altogether. The Florida 
court’s effort may have been imperfect, and it will always be possible 
to challenge the precise guidelines set down by the Florida court, but 
it was a plausible effort to afford the candidates at least some effec-
tive access to the election challenge process that the Florida Statutes 
clearly provide. 
 In contrast to the Florida court’s effort to make the best of a bad 
situation, the Bush v. Gore concurring Justices’ attempt to become 
the definitive arbiters of Florida election law is weak and poorly sup-
ported. The concurring opinion ultimately rests of a combination of 
ipse dixit and feigned astonishment at what the concurring Justices 
apparently viewed as the Florida court’s incompetence. The latter is 
not an overstatement of the concurring Justices’ injudicious treat-
ment of the Florida court; on just one page of the concurring Justices’ 
opinion, they describe various aspects of the Florida court’s interpre-
tation of Florida law as “absurd,” “peculiar,” “inconceivable,” and an 
interpretation that “no reasonable person” would adopt.72 Unfortu-
nately, most of these comments are made in the context of little more 
than conclusory rejections of the Florida court’s statutory analysis, in 
favor of the concurring Justices’ own determinations of what the 
state statutes mean, coupled occasionally with references to support-
ing conclusions from the dissenters in the Florida Supreme Court’s 
opinion.73 
                                                                                                                    
 71. To cite just one simple example, the two statutes describing the state canvassing 
commission’s responsibility to certify the results of elections are inconsistent regarding 
what became a crucial aspect of the 2000 presidential race—i.e., the failure of some county 
canvassing boards to report complete results from their counties by the statutory deadline. 
One statute says that the votes of the counties in which results are not reported in a timely 
fashion “shall be ignored.” Id. § 102.111 (amended 2001). The other statute says that such 
late or inadequate returns “may be ignored.” Id. § 102.112 (amended 2001). As even the 
most rudimentary dictionary will attest, “shall” does not mean the same thing as “may.” If 
the commission “shall” ignore the results, then there is no discretion to accept some results 
because of extenuating circumstances. If the commission “may” ignore the results, then the 
commission has some discretion to accept late results, and the crucial legal issue becomes 
how that discretion is limited by other provisions of Florida law. Choosing “shall” over 
“may” (or vice versa) is itself a value choice about the meaning of state law. The point is: 
the actual text adopted by the Florida Legislature does not decide that question, which is 
why the role of the state courts is critical. 
 72. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 73. See id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Chief Justice Wells’ dissenting 
argument that the voters’ intent statute relied upon by the Florida Supreme Court major-
ity—FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5)—is irrelevant to the resolution of the Gore challenge). 
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 The real answer to the statutory interpretation dilemma in Bush 
v. Gore is that the Florida election laws were badly drafted and often 
inconsistent, and the flaws inherent in these laws were magnified 
when the various certification and voter challenges had to be con-
ducted in the truncated time frame necessary to send a valid certifi-
cation of the election results to Washington for the determination of 
the national presidential election. But does the poor foresight and 
drafting skills of the Florida Legislature and the obvious inadequacy 
of the simple text of Florida election law to answer a particular set of 
new issues justify federal court intrusion into a matter that is tradi-
tionally the exclusive province of the state courts? The concurring 
Justices say “yes,” on the ground that Bush v. Gore involved one of “a 
few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or 
confers a power on a particular branch of a State’s government.”74 
The “exceptional case” in Bush v. Gore is created by the statement in 
Article II that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct,”75 electors for President and Vice 
President. “If we are to respect the [state] legislature’s Article II 
powers,” the concurring Justices insisted, “we must ensure that post-
election state-court actions do not frustrate the legislative desire to 
attain the ‘safe-harbor’ provided by [3 U.S.C.] § 5.”76 Thus, in a 
strange reversal of the usual mechanisms of federalism, the Florida 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own state law is preempted by 
the Federal Court’s perceived need to interpret that state law to im-
plement the Federal Constitution’s preference for another branch of 
state government. 
 This is odd logic, but odder still is the notion that this particular 
example of federal constitutional authority preempts state court en-
forcement of its own law when a multitude of other examples of fed-
eral constitutional authority do not. In the last few decades, the Su-
preme Court has subordinated federal constitutional authority to 
state court power by several different methods. In some of these 
cases the state courts have been allowed to interpret and apply fed-
eral constitutional law and then bind the parties to the state-court 
interpretation—either through the application of res judicata princi-
ples77 or by foreclosing any subsequent federal litigation due to the 
Younger abstention notion that in a system defined by “our federal-
                                                                                                                    
 74. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 75. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 76. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 77. See Migra v. Warren, 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (holding that federal claims may be 
barred from subsequent litigation in federal court if state res judicata rules would bar re-
litigation of claims that should have been raised in previous state court litigation); Allen v. 
McCurry 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (holding that state res judicata and collateral estoppel rules 
apply to bar subsequent federal court litigation of claims and issues previously litigated in 
state court).  
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ism,” state courts are just as competent to interpret and apply fed-
eral law as federal courts.78 How odd that in Bush v. Gore the same 
state courts that are afforded deference in interpreting and applying 
supreme federal law in other contexts cannot be afforded the same 
deference in interpreting and applying state election law with regard 
to which (judging from the unsatisfactory interpretations of that law 
offered by the concurring Justices) the state courts are markedly 
more familiar and competent than the federal courts. 
 Odder still, there is another well-developed body of law that al-
lows state courts to avoid the application of federal law altogether if 
a party has failed to abide by procedural rules that are based entirely 
in state law.79 According to the Supreme Court,  
[t]he procedural default doctrine and its attendant “cause and 
prejudice” standard are “grounded in concerns of comity and feder-
alism. . . .” We therefore require a prisoner to demonstrate cause 
for his state-court default of any federal claim, and prejudice there-
from, before the federal habeas court will consider the merits of 
that claim.80 
 Thus, the United States Supreme Court will apply principles of 
“comity and federalism” to give effect to state court procedural rules 
and adjudications that totally foreclose federal court enforcement of 
federal law in situations that often involve matters of life and death 
(i.e., federal challenges to death sentences) and yet not apply those 
same principles of comity and federalism to state court determina-
tions that are based entirely on interpretations of state election law. 
There is no clear reason why the federal constitutional allocation of 
power between the various branches of state government in Article II 
should give federal courts more authority to intrude into state court 
prerogatives than federal constitutional designations of individual 
rights in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. If any-
thing, the tendency to defer to state courts should run in the opposite 
direction. The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not 
merely favor one branch of state government over another; they com-
pletely foreclose any action by any branch of state government that 
violates these federal provisions. 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
 79.  
Our system affords a defendant convicted in state court numerous opportuni-
ties to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction. . . . These vehicles for 
review, however, are not available indefinitely and without limitation. Proce-
dural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules concerning procedural 
default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit access to review on the 
merits of a constitutional claim.  
Daniels v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 1578, 1582-83 (2001) (citations omitted). 
 80. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000). 
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 So what are we to make of these inconsistencies and anomalies in 
the deference being denied to state courts by the concurring Justices 
in Bush v. Gore? If we take their opinion seriously, the concurring 
Justices must now be reconsidering the range of different circum-
stances in which state courts are allowed to apply independent inter-
pretations of federal law in a way that forecloses subsequent federal 
court consideration of the same matters. These Justices presumably 
must also be reconsidering the situations in which state courts will 
be allowed to apply their own interpretations of independent and 
adequate state legal grounds for relief, where those interpretations 
would have the effect of foreclosing relief on federal grounds. At the 
very least, the Bush v. Gore concurring Justices must mean that fed-
eral courts must now independently interpret state laws that are be-
ing asserted as independent and adequate grounds for relief. Thus, if 
we take the concurring Justices seriously, a great deal that we now 
understand about the relationships between state and federal courts 
is about to change. 
 And yet . . . it is odd that the concurring Justices would choose 
Bush v. Gore to announce such a major change in their heretofore 
very different attitudes toward deferring to state courts. It is also 
strange that the concurring Justices did not mention the implications 
of their opinions on any of these other areas of traditional deference 
to state courts. Thus, with regard to the concurring Justices’ ap-
proach to federal court enforcement of Article II, as with regard to 
the majority’s approach to the Equal Protection Clause, there is the 
lingering suspicion that maybe the Justices in the Bush v. Gore ma-
jority do not really intend to adhere consistently to their newfound 
fondness for a strong equal protection jurisprudence and reinvigo-
rated federal court supremacy. But if the Justices do not intend to 
adhere consistently to these new principles, what justifies the result 
in Bush v. Gore? The answer may lie in the Court’s own disclaimer to 
its equal protection ruling: “Our consideration is limited to the pre-
sent circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election 
processes generally presents many complexities.”81 The Justices 
themselves tell us, in other words, that we should not expect Bush v. 
Gore to have any effect on constitutional doctrine beyond the 
boundaries of this one, isolated dispute. It is in the context of the 
Court’s own disclaimer—“[o]ur consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances”82—that it is possible to draw some preliminary con-
clusions about the broader consequences of Bush v. Gore. 
                                                                                                                    
 81. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109. 
 82. Id. 
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   A FEW PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF TAKING BUSH V. GORE SERIOUSLY 
 The main obstacle to taking Bush v. Gore seriously is that no one 
really believes that the Bush v. Gore majority intends to follow the 
logic of its decision beyond the results of the case that decided the 
presidential election of 2000. It is highly unlikely that a majority of 
Justices on the current Supreme Court will ever pursue the implica-
tions of their Bush v. Gore ruling even in other election cases, much 
less in cases outside the election context. The Court inasmuch as said 
so itself: “Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances.”83 So how are we to explain the Bush v. Gore result in a way 
that preserves the usual requisites of judicial review, such as the ex-
pectations that the Court’s doctrine will be determinate, generalized, 
consistent, and coherent? 
 If we abandon the pretense that Bush v. Gore is connected in any 
way to a systematic body of doctrine, then it is possible to construct 
an explanation for the Court’s behavior. The most sensible way to do 
so is to argue along with Judge Richard Posner that the decision can 
be explained as an example of “rough justice.”84 Posner’s theory is 
that the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Florida law, and that 
even if the recount did go forward under such a misinterpretation, 
Gore probably would have lost anyway. This argument begs the 
question by assuming that even if the Florida Supreme Court did 
misinterpret Florida law (which, contrary to Posner’s rather superfi-
cial analysis, the Florida Court almost certainly did not85) the United 
                                                                                                                    
 83. Id. 
 84. Posner, supra note 6, at 736. 
 85. Posner’s primary complaints about the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Florida election statutes are that (1) the Florida court did not respect the power of the Sec-
retary of State to be free from judicial interference in exercising discretion to reject votes 
from counties whose results were deemed by her to be out of compliance with Florida law, 
see id. at 729-30; (2) the Florida court interpreted the Florida contest statutory term “error 
in the vote tabulation” to include mismarked ballots that could not be read by machine, id. 
at 730 (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1283-84 
(Fla. 2000)); and (3) the Florida court interpreted the contest statute expansively to pro-
vide legal remedies independent of the Florida protest statute, thus making “the protest a 
meaningless preliminary to the contest and expanded, without any basis in the statute, the 
power of the courts relative to that of the [election] officials,” id. at 731. This is not the 
place for a full exegesis of Florida election law precedents, and some leeway has to be af-
forded for the fact that so many outside observers have had to become experts on Florida 
election law so quickly, but suffice it to say for present purposes that Judge Posner is al-
most certainly wrong—as a matter of Florida legislative history, precedents, and the rea-
sonable application of English usage—on the latter two points. The first point is more 
complicated, but again if the full range of Florida administrative law regarding the discre-
tion granted to the Secretary of State is taken into account, Posner is probably wrong on 
that score as well. But the point is, it does not matter: jurisdictional limits being what they 
are, it does not matter what a federal appellate court judge—or for that matter a United 
States Supreme Court Justice—thinks Florida law means. Determining the meaning of 
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States Supreme Court has legal authority to override the Florida 
Court’s interpretation. This is the argument of the Bush v. Gore con-
curring Justices, which is addressed in the previous section of this 
Article. The more important point is that the “rough justice” argu-
ment more or less concedes that Bush v. Gore was, in the end, an un-
principled, ad hoc decision. It is essentially an argument that some-
body had to decide the election, and it may as well have been the 
United States Supreme Court as any other governmental body. 
 This argument will not ultimately be sufficient to salvage Bush v. 
Gore from its critics. The “rough justice” argument is insufficient be-
cause it does not require the Court to provide a statement of law to 
which everyone on both sides of the political divide can potentially 
benefit; thus such a decision cannot satisfy the requirement that law 
be generalized and applicable to every party encountering similar 
circumstances. The argument is also insufficient because it provides 
fodder for those advancing the crasser theories of the judicial process 
as radically indeterminate, and if the perception of radical indeter-
minacy becomes too great, it robs the courts of their ability to segre-
gate law from politics.86 Finally, it is insufficient precisely because it 
is an argument for ad hoc justice, and if ad hoc justice is not inevita-
bly corrupt (in the sense that decisions are sold to the highest bid-
der), it will probably always be perceived as corrupt, and from the 
perspective of the courts that perception is probably just as debilitat-
ing as actual corruption itself. 
 In the end, assessing the meaning of Bush v. Gore presents legal 
analysts with a vexing quandary. In finally coming to terms with 
Bush v. Gore and its relationship to the Supreme Court’s general 
constitutional jurisprudence, it is not healthy for those of us within 
the legal system to insist on thinking of the case in the dark terms of 
corruption or the other disparaging characterizations that many pre-
vious commentators have applied to the majority’s decision. But it is 
also implausible to take Bush v. Gore seriously as an articulation of 
new constitutional doctrine. I would rather choose a third option and 
view the decision in a more lighthearted vein. We cannot take the 
case seriously as doctrine, and we do not want to take it seriously as 
evidence of corruption or irresponsibility. So maybe we should just 
write off the entire exercise as five Supreme Court Justices’ little 
joke and hope that the fact that few people are laughing will cause 
                                                                                                                    
Florida law is the job of the Florida Supreme Court, which frankly accomplished that task 
with much more aplomb than its critics. 
 86. “Determinacy is necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both theorists and 
judges. It is the only way judges can appear to apply the law rather than make it.” Joseph 
William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,  12 
(1984). 
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the members of the next majority who confront a similar dispute to 
take their jobs a little more seriously. 
